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COMMENTS
DECEIT DAMAGES IN CALIFORNIA:
OLD PROBLEM-NEW DEPARTURE?
In the summer of 1963, Mr. Burkhouse and his wife responded
to an intriguing newspaper advertisement which offered for sale
a forty-five acre "Gentleman's Farm", including a large orchard
of English walnuts and a comfortable home.' The Burkhouses
were interested in purchasing property to which they could even-
tually retire. The owner of the property and his broker assured
the prospective buyers that the yearly net income from the walnut
crop was sufficient to cover the trust deed payments and expen-
ses of maintaining the property. The Burkhouses purchased the
land.
In a short time, the unfortunate vendees discovered that the
net income from the walnut crop had been greatly overstated;
consequently, they were unable to maintain the mortgage pay-
ments on the "Gentleman's Farm" and the seller foreclosed. When
they sued the seller and broker for fraud, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the defendants. The trial judge was required
to instruct the jury that under California law the defrauded buy-
ers could not recover unless the land they purchased was of lesser
value than the sum paid for it. This was apparently not true
of the Burkhouses' "Gentleman's Farm." 2
Sadly, the experience of the Burkhouses is not atypical.
Many innocent purchasers who have sought relief against de-
ceitful vendors have encountered California's stringent damage
rule for fraud' in the purchase, sale and exchange of property.
1. The facts are based on the case of Burkhouse v. Phillips, 18 Cal. App.
3d 661, 96 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1971). See notes 34-39 and accompanying text infra.
2. The story had a relatively happy ending. On appeal the verdict of the
jury was vacated on grounds that the trial court's instruction, limiting damages
to the difference between what the plaintiffs paid and the value of what they
received, was erroneous under the circumstances. Upon adequate proof that the
foreclosure resulted from the fraud, plaintiffs were allowed to recover their down
payment and sums paid toward the purchase price. While the ruling of the ap-
pellate court seems fair, its reasoning was somewhat tortured. See notes 37-
39 and accompanying text infra.
3. Actual fraud by a party to a contract is defined in CAL. CIv. CODE §
1572 (West 1971) as follows:
Actual fraud, within the meaning of this Chapter, consists in any
of the following acts, committed by a party to the contract, or with his
SANTA CLARA LAWYER [Vol. 14
The law of damages for fraud in property transactions has in-
deed had a troubled history in California.' Confronted for
years with a relatively clear but overly restrictive statutory rule
for fraud damages in the sale of property, the California judiciary
created an elaborate scheme of exceptions and fictions in an at-
tempt to obtain complete and satisfactory relief for the wronged
plaintiff. Even so, recoverable damages for fraud in the sale of
property fell short of the relief available for breach of contract.
In 1971, the state legislature substantially modified the stat-
utory mandate on fraud damages in the purchase, sale and ex-
change of property by amending California Civil Code section
3343.V The amended statute may assist those fraud victims who
connivance, with intent to deceive another party thereto, or to induce
him to enter into the contract:
1. The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who
does not believe it to be true;
2. The positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the infor-
mation of the person making it, of that which is not true, though he
believes it to be true;
3. The suppression of that which is true, by one having knowledge
or belief of the fact;
4. A promise made without any intention of performing it; or,
5. Any other act fitted to deceive.
Liability for fraudulent deceit is established under CAL. Crv. CODE § 1709 (West
1971) which provides that "[o]ne who willfully deceives another with intent to
induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage
which he thereby suffers." A deceit, within the meaning of section 1709 is de-
fined as either:
1. The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who
does not believe it to be true;
2. The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who
has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true;
3. The suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it,
or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for
want of communication of that fact; or,
4. A promise, made without any intention of performing it.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1710 (West 1971).
The fraud and deceit provisions have been held to be interchangeable and
the same damage rules apply to both. Stone v. Farnell, 239 F.2d 750, 754 (9th
Cir. 1956); Sixta v. Ochsner, 187 Cal. App. 2d 485, 490, 9 Cal. Rptr. 617, 620
(1960).
4. Crane, Recent Decisions on Damages in Commercial Cases in California,
12 HAST. L.J. 109 (1960); Project, A Comparison of California Sales Law and
Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 U.C.L.A. L. Rlv. 78, 138
(1963); Comment, Recovery in Deceit Actions in California, 11 HAST. L.J. 183
(1959); Comment, Imposing Liability on Data Processing Services-Should Cali-
fornia Choose Fraud or Warranty?, 13 SANTA CLAA LAw. 140, 152 (1972); Com-
ment, Expanded Remedies for Real Estate Broker's Misrepresentations, 12 STAN.
L. REv. 270 (1959); 43 CALIF. L. REv. 356 (1955); 48 CALIF. L. REv. 342
(1960); 47 CALIF. ST. B.J. 126 (1971); 13 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 168 (1939); 7 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 147 (1960).
5. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3343 (West Supp. 1973), amending CAL. CIV. CODE §
3343 (West 1970). Amended section 3343 provides as follows:
(a) One defrauded in the purchase, sale or exchange of property is en-
titled to recover the difference between the actual value of that with
which the defrauded person parted and the actual value of that which
he received, together with any additional damage arising from the par-
ticular transaction, including any of the following:
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find themselves in the position of Mr. and Mrs. Burkhouse, and
will reduce the anomalous disparity between recoverable damages
under different legal theories. However, the ultimate remedial
effect of the amendment to section 3343 is unclear. Although
the 1971 version of the statute has not yet been construed in a
reported decision, this comment will recommend guidelines for
its interpretation based on the history of the statute, standard
principles of statutory construction, and considered criticism of the
traditional fraud damage rules.6
(1) Amounts actually and reasonably expended in reliance upon the
fraud.
(2) An amount which would compensate the defrauded party for loss
of use and enjoyment of the property to the extent that any such loss
was proximately caused by the fraud.
(3) Where the defrauded party has been induced by reason of the fraud
to sell or otherwise part with the property in question, an amount
which will compensate him for profits or other gains which might rea-
sonably have been earned by use of the property had he retained it.
(4) Where the defrauded party has been induced by reason of the
fraud to purchase or otherwise acquire the property in question, an
amount which will compensate him for any loss of profits or other
gains which were reasonably anticipated and would have been earned
by him from the use or sale of the property had it possessed the char-
acteristics fraudulently attributed to it by the party committing the fraud,
provided that lost profits from the use or sale of the property shall be
recoverable only if and only to the extent that all of the following ap-
ply:
(i) The defrauded party acquired the property for the purpose of using
or reselling it for a profit.
(ii) The defrauded party reasonably relied on the fraud in entering
into the transaction and in anticipating profits from the subsequent use
or sale of the property.
(iii) Any loss of profits for which damages are sought under this para-
graph have been proximately caused by the fraud and the defrauded
party's reliance on it.
(b) Nothing in this section shall do either of the following:
(1) Permit the defrauded person to recover any amount measured by
the difference between the value of property as represented and the ac-
tual value thereof.
(2) Deny to any person having a cause of action for fraud or deceit
any legal or equitable remedies to which such person may be entitled.
The amendment to section 3343 was part of the 1971 legislative program
of the State Bar of California and was sponsored by Senator Song as Cal. S.B.
669, Reg. Sess. (1971).
6. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3343(b)(1) (West Supp. 1973) reserves to the plain-
tiff who has a cause of action for fraud or deceit all legal and equitable reme-
dies to which he may be entitled. In considering alternative theories of recovery
relevant factors include not only the applicable measure of damages, but also
the statute of limitations, allocation of the burden of proof, pleading require-
ments, defenses or equitable limitations, and election of remedies problems. The
practitioner might look to the following in addition to damages for fraud: 1)
Fraud as a defense to contractual obligations; 2) Damages for breach of war-
ranty or contract (See CAL. CIrV. CODE § 3306 (West 1970)); 3) Specific perform-
ance, with abatement for deficiencies in defendant's title, lost profits, etc. (Ellis
v. Mihelis, 60 Cal. 2d 206, 348 P.2d 7, 32 Cal. Rptr. 415.(1963); D-K Investment
Corp. v. Sutter, 19 Cal. App. 3d 537, 96 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1971); Collins v. Marvel
Land Co., 13 Cal. App. 3d 34, 91 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1970); HETLAND, CALIFORNA
REAL ESTATE SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 3.33, at 76 (California Continuing Educa-
tion of the Bar 1970) [hereinafter cited as HETLAND]; 4) Contractual rescission
for fraud, actual or constructive (CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1688-93 (West 1973)); cf.
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ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF DAMAGES FOR FRAUD
Under the common law two distinct rules for measuring dam-
ages for fraud in the purchase, sale and exchange of property were
developed. 7  One rule, the "loss of bargain" standard, respects
the plaintiff's contractual expectancy and puts him in the position
he would have enjoyed had the representation been true. The
other rule, called the "out of pocket" measure, has a pre-transac-
tion orientation and is based on the familiar tort principle of re-
storing plaintiff to the position he enjoyed prior to the harm.
It has been recognized that there are limitations to each of these
rules. Accordingly, the modem view is that a court should en-
joy some flexibility in determining the appropriate rule for dam-
ages in property transaction cases.
Knowledge of these alternative common law damage rules
and their application is important to an understanding of Cal-
ifornia's new version of section 3343. In some respects the new
fraud damage statute represents a departure from the traditional
"loss of bargain" and "out of pocket" standards. But the struc-
ture and content of the legislation can only be explained and crit-
icized in terms of prior judicial experience with the "loss of
bargain" and "out of pocket" rules.
The "Benefit of Bargain" Rule
A majority of American jurisdictions have adopted the "bene-
fit of bargain" standard" which awards to the defrauded plaintiff
an expectancy interest; it puts him in the position he would have
enjoyed had the false representation been true.9 Most often the
measure of recoverable loss under the "benefit of bargain" stand-
ard is calculated by taking the difference between the actual
Kent v. Clark, 20 Cal. 2d 779, 128 P.2d 868 (1942); Snelson v. Ondulando
Highlands Corp., 5 Cal. App. 3d 243, 84 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1970); HETLAND §
12.22. Exemplary damages have been awarded where rescission is based on
fraud. Mahon v. Berg, 267 Cal. App. 2d 588, 73 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1968); HET-
LAND § 12.22, at 55 (Supp. 1972); 5) Specific statutory relief (Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act, CAL. CIrv. CODE § 1790 et seq. (West 1973); Automo-
bile Sale Finance Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 2981 et seq. (West Supp. 1973); Con-
sumers Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIv. CODE § 1750 et seq. (West 1973); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2224 et seq. (West 1954) (the so-called involuntary trust remedy)).
7. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 592 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as DOBBS]; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 450-51
(1935) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 734 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
8. Perhaps two-thirds of American jurisdictions have adopted the "loss of
bargain" rule for deceit actions. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 734; Comment, Re-
covery in Deceit Actions in California, 11 HAST. L.J. 183, 184; Annot., 13
A.L.R.3d 875 (1967).
9. DOBBS, supra note 7, at 595.
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value of the property which plaintiff received and the value that
this property would have had if the representations concerning it
had been truthful. 10 If, for example, farm acreage was pur-
chased on the basis of a deliberately false representation that the
land included an operating water well, the buyer would be entitled
to the difference in value between the same farm with a working
well and the property which he actually received.
Sometimes the "benefit of bargain" standard is formulated
as the cost of putting the property into the represented condi-
tion. 1 Thus, in the example given above, the plaintiffs dam-
ages would be equal to the cost of drilling a new well and in-
stalling a pump. Before 1935, California had no statutory meas-
ure of damages for fraud in the sale of property." During this
era of judicial discretion California courts generally applied the
"benefit of bargain" rule to determine plaintiffs' recoverable loss,
but the "cost of conformation" measure (the expense of putting
the property into the represented condition) was not unknown.13
For example, in Crystal Pier Amusement Co. v. Cannan 4 the
plaintiff, Crystal Pier, decided to erect an amusement pier, in-cluding a ballroom, at Pacific Beach on the California coast. In
negotiations with plaintiff the defendants, materialmen and con-
tractors, fraudulently indicated that piling, caps and braces
treated with creosote, a wood preserving material, were neces-
sary and would be supplied for construction of the pier. Defend-
ants actually supplied materials which were not treated with
creosote but with an inferior sealing product. The amusement
pier was closed for safety reasons and the plaintiff sued for
damages. The appellate court affirmed an award in excess of
$91,000, which was based on the cost of replacing three-
fourths of the pier.'" It was noted that had the more common
"benefit of bargain" rule been applied an even larger recovery
would have been warranted.
In any event, it is clear that in "loss of bargain" cases proof
10. Jacobs v. Levin, 58 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 913, 915, 137 P.2d 500, 501
(1943); McKeever v. Locke-Paddon Co., 58 Cal. App. 51, 55, 207 P. 1040, 1042
(1922); MCCORMICK 451; PROSSER, supra note 7, at 734; Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d
875, 899 (1967).
11. DOBBS, supra note 7, at 595.
12. See notes 59-64 and accompanying text infra.
13. Id.
14. 219 Cal. 184, 192, 25 P.2d 839, 842-43 (1933). The "cost of conforma-
tion" generally has been considered probative in determining the actual value
of the property received at the time of sale for "out of pocket" damage pur-
poses. Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 875, 925 (1967), citing inter alia McNeill v. Bred-
berg, 192 Cal. App. 2d 458, 13 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1961) and Central Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Schmidt, 152 Cal. App. 2d 671, 313 P.2d 132 (1957).
15. Crystal Pier Amusement Co. v. Cannan, 219 Cal. 184, 192, 25 P.2d 839,
842-43 (1933).
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of the actual amount paid by the defrauded person for the property
is per se irrelevant. The material values are the worth of the
property received and its hypothetical value were it as represented.
Nevertheless, the consideration which plaintiff gave for the prop-
erty may be probative as to the value of what he received.' 6
Thus, if a defrauded buyer pays four thousand dollars for arid
property falsely represented to be benefitted by water rights, and
the value of the land without the water rights is one hundred dol-
lars, the high price paid by the vendee is relevant and material
evidence of the true value of the property as it was deceptively
described.
The "loss of bargain" damage rule approximates the recov-
ery which is available for breach of warranty in contract ac-
tions.' 7 This is not surprising, for the affinity between the damage
measure for breach of warranty and for deceit can be traced to
their common procedural origin in the common law writ of tres-
pass on the case,' or "action on the case in the nature of de-
ceit", " ' as it was sometimes called. There is, moreover, a the-
oretical link between the two damage rules in that the defendant
in fraud actions involving the sale of goods is said to "warrant"
the truth of his statements2" in the same way that the contract
vendor warrants his goods.
In practical terms, the "loss of bargain" damage formula
insures that the fraud victim receives the gains he legitimately ex-
pects and to which he is entitled under a contract for the pur-
chase, sale, or exchange of property. It is noteworthy that an
action for benefit of bargain damages, although based on fraud,
has traditionally been interpreted as an "affirmation" of the un-
derlying contract between plaintiff and defendant. As a result,
plaintiffs have been obligated to accept the burden of the contract
to enjoy the benefit of their bargain. 2 1
Criticism of the "loss of bargain" damage rule has been
16. Divani v. Donovan, 214 Cal. 447, 6 P.2d 247 (1931); Hines v. Brode,
168 Cal. 507, 510, 143 P. 729, 730 (1914).
17. Hines v. Brode, 168 Cal. 507, 511, 143 P. 729, 731 (1914); MCCORMICK,
supra note 7, at 451; PROSSER, supra note 7, at 592; Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 833
(1967).
18. DOBBS, supra note 7, at 592.
19. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 685.
20. S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1392, at 439-
40 (3d ed. 1968).
21. McKeever v. Locke-Paddon Co., 58 Cal. App. 51, 56, 207 P. 1040, 1042(1922). At common law an election was required between rescission of a con-
tract for fraud and a suit for damages. Garvey v. Lashells, 151 Cal. 526, 91
P. 498 (1907); Worely v. Nethercctt, 91 Cal. 517, 27 P. 767 (1891); Gates v.
McLean, 70 Cal. 42, 11 P. 489 (1886). Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1692 (West
1973), added by Cal. Stats. (1961), ch. 589, § 3, at 1734; CAL. COMM. CODE §
2721 (West 1964), added by Cal. Stats. (1963), ch. 819.
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scanty and confined to arguments of a specious nature relating
to the indeterminability of expectancy damages and the inappro-
priateness of bargain loss damages under a tort theory of recov-
ery.
22
By a revision of section 3343 in 1971, the California legis-
lature has eschewed both the "cost of conformation" standard and
the traditional "loss of bargain" rule.2" California law, however,
now permits a defrauded purchaser to recover, under restricted
circumstances,24 lost profits or gains which were reasonably
anticipated from use or resale of the property.25
"Out of Pocket" Damages
. The second general rule devised by the common law for meas-
uring damages in fraud actions is the so-called "out of pocket"
standard. This rule is directed towards restoring plaintiff to
the financial position he enjoyed prior to the fraudulent trans-
action.20 It is therefore sometimes called the "restitutionary
measure". Under the "out of pocket" formula, damages are
measured by the difference in actual value at the time of the trans-
action, if any, between what the defrauded party gave and that
which he received in return.
27
Operation of the "out of pocket" and "loss of bargain" rules
can be illustrated by elaboration on an earlier example. Sup-
pose the plaintiff pays $4,000 for the arid acreage falsely said
to be benefitted by certain water rights which would make culti-
vation possible. The land without the water rights is worth only
$100. The true value of the property with the alleged water
rights would be $5,000. Under the "out of pocket" rule the
22. Comment, Recovery in Deceit Actions in California, 11 HAST. L.J. 183,
194 (1959), citing DAWSON AND PALMER, CASES ON RESTITUTION 235 (2d ed.
1958). The arguments are summarily refuted in Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 875, 883-
84 (1967).
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343(b)(1) (West Supp. 1973) provides: "Nothing
in this section shall . . . [p]ermit the defrauded person to recover any amount
measured by the difference between the value of the property as represented and
the actual value thereof."
24. The defrauded party must have been induced to purchase or otherwise
acquire the property by reason of the fraud. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343(a)(4)
(West Supp. 1973). The property must have been acquired for use or resale
for a profit. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343(a)(4)(i) (West Supp. 1973). The de-
frauded person must reasonably have relied on the fraud in anticipating profits
from the use or resale of the property. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3343(a)(4)(ii) (West
Supp. 1973). And the lost profits must be a proximate result of the fraud and
the party's reliance thereon. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343(a)(4)(iii) (West Supp.
1973).
25. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3343(a) (4) (West Supp. 1973).
26. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 449.
27. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3343 (West 1954), as amended, CAL. CIv. CODE § 3343
(a) (West Supp. 1973); PROSSER, supra note 7, at 733-34.
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plaintiff would be entitled to the difference in value between
what he gave ($4,000) and what he got ($100) or, $3,900.
The "loss of bargain" rule would allow recovery of the difference
in value between the actual value of the property which the de-
ceived buyer received ($100) and the value it would have had
had the water rights been available ($5,000) or, $4,900.
The "restitutionary measure" represents the English posi-
tion,2 8 the old federal rule,29 the Restatement position, 0 and the
minority American rule."1 Between 1935 and 1971, the "out of
pocket" measure was ostensibly the exclusive standard for fraud
damages in California; 2 and the formula is even today the cor-
nerstone of California's fraud damage statute. 83
Although the "out of pocket" rule is simple, definite, and
easy to apply, it has been criticized on a number of distinct
grounds. For example, the measure works a hardship on plain-
tiffs when the market value of the property at the time of the trans-
action is difficult to establish and when, despite the fraud, the ac-
tual value of the property received was equivalent to the consid-
eration paid.
The recent case of Burkhouse v. Phillips, 4 alluded to ear-
lier, illustrates this failing. In Burkhouse plaintiff purchased a
forty-five acre "Gentleman's Farm" for $80,000 in reliance on
the fraudulent representations of the vendors and their broker
that walnut trees on the property produced a standard crop which
would net sufficient income to pay for the property. 5 Plaintiff
was unable to make the trust deed payments, because the prop-
erty did not yield the income represented by the defendants.
Plaintiff sued for rescission and damages, deleting the cause of
action for rescission after defendants foreclosed the deed of trust
and sold to a third party. Unfortunately, evidence adduced at
28. Peek v. Derry, 37 Ch. D. 541 (1887).
29. Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U.S. 116 (1900); Comment, Recovery in Deceit
Actions in California, 11 HAST. L.J. 183, 184 (1959), citing Jacobs v. Levin, 58
Cal. App. 2d Supp. 913, 916, 137 P.2d 500, 501 (1943). Jacobs v. Levitz stated
that in the wake of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which abol-
ished federal common law on substantive matters, "the main support for the mi-
nority rule would appear to have collapsed." 58 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 916, 137
P.2d at 501.
30. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 549 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 549 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964) adopts the flexibility theory. See note
44 infra.
31. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 734, found twelve jurisdictions adhering to the
"out of pocket" rule.
32. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text infra.
33. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3343(a) (West Supp. 1973) retains the old "out of
pocket" rule, while the remainder of the amended statute provides for conse-
quential damages.
34. 18 Cal. App. 3d 661, 96 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1971).
35. Id. at 664, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
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trial indicated that at the time of sale the property's market value
was worth slightly more than plaintiff had paid for it." The
trial court's instruction, based on a strict application of the "out of
pocket" rule, resulted in plaintiff's establishing all the elements of
fraud and being left without provable damages or the right of re-
scission.
On appeal, the instruction of the trial judge was held to
be erroneous. The appellate court in Burkhouse did recognize
that under the "out of pocket" rule the plaintiffs cannot get dam-
ages for fraud when there is no difference between the sale price
of the land and its market value. The Burkhouse court also care-
fully noted that the defrauded buyers had no right to rescind the
transaction and return the real property for their down payment
because the property had been sold to third parties in the fore-
closure sale. Faced with the spectre of a provable fraud and econ-
omic loss without a corresponding right to damages or rescission,
the court ruled that the foreclosure was a "subsequent circum-
stance" to be considered, and that "out of pocket" damages must
be "realistically" applied.87 If it were established on remand that
the defendants committed fraud and that the plaintiffs were unable
to make their installment payments as a proximate result thereof,
the proper measure of damages was indicated to be the sum of
the down payment and installments paid.3 8 While the court called
this potential recovery by the Burkhouse plaintiffs "out of pocket
loss", it is apparent that the circumstances of the case required
the fashioning of a unique remedy for the plaintiffs.
The Burkhouse result seems correct; if - the plaintiffs re-
ceived damages equal to their down payment and installments
they would be essentially restored to their pre-transaction status-
the theoretical goal of the "out of pocket" standard. Unfortu-
nately the Burkhouse ruling leaves essentially unharmed the fraudu-
lent seller who foreclosed and bought in at the forecl6sure sale.
The "out of pocket" rule has often been criticized precisely
because it does not deter frauds. Thus, an unscrupulous vendor
may make false representations concerning the character, quality,
value, rents or income of property to induce its sale. Yet the
"out of pocket" rule will protect the unprincipled seller from lia-
bility for damages so long as the property is sold, as in Burk-
house, for its market value.3
36. Id.
37. Id. at 665-66, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
38. Id.
39. S. WILLISTON, supra note 20, § 1392, at 442. The argument is also
made in the dissenting opinion of Justice Schauer in Bagdasarian v. Gragnon,
31 Cal. 2d 744, 764, 192 P.2d 935, 947 (1948) and in Jacobs v. Levin, 58 Cal.
App. 2d Supp. 913, 916, 137 P.2d 500, 501 (1943). The force of the argu-
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Gagne v. Bertran4 ° further shows how the "restitutionary
measure" can work a hardship on defrauded persons. In Gagne
defendant falsely represented himself as a qualified soil tester.
Plaintiff relied on defendant's incorrect report as to the amount of
fill on certain lands, and exercised his option to purchase the prop-
erty. Because there was no proof of "out of pocket" damages,
plaintiff was barred from recovering the additional construction
costs which resulted from having to build on deep fill.4
Justice Schauer dissented in Gagne, arguing that the defend-
ant soil tester was not himself a fraudulent vendor of property
and that California's existing "out of pocket" damage statute was
therefore inapplicable.4" The statute only applied to frauds in the
purchase, sale and exchange of property. Justice Schauer char-
acterized the inaccurate soil test as the breach of a contract for
skilled personal services or as negligence in the performance of
such services. In either case the plaintiffs would be entitled to
the increased cost of installing the foundation on deep fill. Gagne
illustrates the complexities and inequities of applying the restric-
tive "out of pocket" rule to fraud actions concerning the sale of
property while simultaneously permitting a broader measure of re-
covery for negligence and breach of warranty.
A final objection to the "out of pocket" rule is that it offends
basic principles of justice when it fails to compensate an innocent
party for loss, through deceit, of legitimately expected profit. This
is a fortiori true when plaintiffs can recover lost profits in con-
tract actions where intent to deceive is absent.48
Flexibility Theory
Cognizant of the merits and failings of both the "loss of
bargain" and "out of pocket" rules for damages in fraud actions,
ment is mitigated somewhat when exemplary damages are available. See Ward
v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 743, 336 P.2d 534, 538 (1959); Haigler v. Donnelly,
18 Cal. 2d 674, 680-82, 117 P.2d 331, 335 (1941); MCCORMICK, supra note 7,
at 45-54.
40. 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).
41. Id. at 490-91, 275 P.2d at 21-22 (dicta). The majority believed that
California Civil Code section 3333 was the applicable measure of damages and,
in any event, saw no causal link between defendant's representations and the
additional costs of construction. However, it was actually the "out of pocket"
rule which the court applied. Compare Rogaff v. Bartles, 115 Cal. App. 429,
1 P.2d 517 (1931) where the vendor himself represented that there was no fill
on the property. As to lost profits recovery for breach of contract, see notes
108-110 and accompanying text inira.
42. 43 Cal. 2d 481, 494, 275 P.2d 15 (1954) (dissenting opinion of Justice
Schauer).
43. See Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 2d 744, 764, 192 P.2d 935, 947(1948) (dissenting opinion of Justice Schauer); PRossEa, supra note 7, at 734-
35.
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courts, legislatures and commentators have turned to a more flex-
ible system whereby the standard for relief elected would be based
on the equities of the case and the available proof.44  This flex-
ibility theory is considered the modem or emerging view." The
1971 amendment to section 3343 appears to bring California
somewhat closer to the flexibility theory."
While the flexibility theory permits a choice between the
"out of pocket" and "loss of bargain" rules, the election of the
proper standard for a given factual context should be exercised on
a consistent and rational basis. Although case law relative to
the choice between the damage rules is sparse, some guidelines
have emerged.
It has been asserted that the "loss of bargain" rule is best
suited to most situations for two reasons. First, the "loss of bar-
gain" rule will yield a larger recovery to the wronged purchaser
who has negotiated a good deal than would the "out of pocket"
rule. The value of the property as represented, in such cases,
substantially exceeds the value of the property actually received.
Obviously, the more exaggerated the deceitful claims, the greater
the disparity between the value of the property as described and
its actual value. Secondly, the "loss of bargain" measure operates
as a deterrent to fraud, unlike the "out of pocket rule". This is
so because under the restitutionary rule the fraudulent vendor is
only required to restore the profit he made on the particular trans-
44. Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 875 (1967); DOBBS, supra note 7, at 596; RESTATE-
MENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 549 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964) has explicitly
adopted the "flexibility theory" as follows:
(1) The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is entitled to
recover as damages in deceit against the maker the pecuniary loss to him
of which the misrepresentation is a legal cause, including
(a) the difference between the value of what he has received in
the transaction and its purchase price or other value given for
it; and
(b) pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as a consequence of the re-
cipient's reliance upon the misrepresentation.
(2) The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation in a business
transaction is also entitled to recover damage sufficient to give him the
benefit of his contract with the maker, if such damages are proved with
reasonable certainty.
The Restatement indicates that the "out of pocket" rule does not afford just
and satisfactory compensation when the value of what the plaintiff has received
is equal to the consideration he has parted with and also when the thing plaintiff
receives has value but is useless to him because of the misrepresentation. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549, comments i, j, at 158-59 (Tent. Draft
No. 10, 1964).
45. DoBaS, supra note 7, at 596. Professor Dobbs found four jurisdictions
which explicitly or implicitly adhere to the flexibility theory. Id. at 597 n.16.
46. California Civil Code section 3343 now allows the recovery of lost profits
in addition to "out of pocket" damages, if certain limitations are met. See note
5 supra. The issue still remains whether California courts will allow defrauded
plaintiffs to receive damages measured by the "loss of bargain" rather than the
"out of pocket" rule.
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action without suffering sufficient detriment to discourage similar
fraudulent conduct later.47  The possibility of consequential and
exemplary damages,4 8 however, somewhat detracts from the force
of this argument.
While the "out of pocket" or restitutionary rule does not de-
ter fraud, a court might consider it to be the preferable measure
of damages when the fraudulent representation is less definite,
when the "loss of bargain" damages would be difficult to ascer-
tain, or when the defendant appears to be less culpable.49 For
example, the deterrent effect of the "loss of bargain" rule would
be inappropriate where the defendant was an innocent seller
who was held liable as principal for fraud committed by his agent,
a real estate broker.50
In addition to the aspect of deterrence, certainty of proof
has been a critical factor in selecting between the "out of pocket"
and "loss of bargain" rules in instances in which discretion has
been available to the courts. For example, the difficult problem
of valuing real property is compounded when an exchange of two
or more parcels is involved. There has accordingly been a prefer-
ence for the "out of pocket" rule in cases involving fraud in the
exchange of property.51 The "out of pocket" measure only re-
quires a determination of the market value of the two parcels at
the time of the exchange, and avoids speculation as to the hypo-
thetical value of property as represented. In the early case of
Barbour v. Flick,52 the plaintiffs were residents of Chicago who
traded certain encumbered property which they owned in that
city for a ranch which defendant owned in San Diego County, in-
cluding certain personal property. Plaintiff executed a $13,000
note and mortgage to cover the supposed difference in values be-
tween the two properties. The trial awarded the plaintiffs the
difference between the market value of the ranch and personal
property at the time of the exchange ($15,000) and the value of
the same property as represented ($30,000), although the parties
hotly contested the value of the California ranch as the defendant
47. DOBBS, supra note 7, at 596. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
48. See 23 CAL. JuR. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 91 (1955).
49. See McDonald v. Roeth, 179 Cal. 194, 176 P. 38 (1918); Hines v. Brode,
168 Cal. 507, 511, 143 P. 729, 730 (1914); Williams v. Spazier, 21 P.2d 470
(Cal. Ct. App. 1933) (not reported in Official State Reports); MCCORMICK, su-
pra note 7, at 454; PROSSER, supra note 7, at 735.
50. See 23 CAL. JuR. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 48 (1955).
51. Cross v. Bouck, 175 Cal. 253, 256, 165 P. 702, 703 (1917); Barbour v.
Flick, 127 Cal. 628, 633, 59 P. 122, 124 (1899); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 875, 885
(1967). While California courts generally applied the "benefit of bargain" stand-
ard prior to enactment of Civil Code section 3343, Barbour and Cross each em-
ployed the "out of pocket" rule to cases involving exchanges of property.
52. 126 Cal. 628, 59 P. 122 (1899).
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described it. The California Supreme Court sustained the defend-
ants' contention that the true measure of plaintiffs' damages was
the difference between the market value of the San Diego prop-
erty and the net market value of the Chicago property (the value
less liens and encumbrances).13  Consistent with the "out of poc-
ket" or restitutionary rule which was found proper, the court per-
mitted cancellation of the $13,000 note and mortgage plaintiffs
had executed. -Evidence of the value of the San Diego property
as represented was therefore unimportant.
The "flexibility theory" is also supported by the practical
consideration that the "loss of bargain" and "out of pocket" rules
will not conform to the factual structure of all fraudulently in-
duced sales and purchases. To illustrate, when a seller is fraudu-
lently induced to part with his property by a false devaluation of
what he relinquishes, the "out of pocket" measure is really the
only applicable nile. 4 This is so because the "loss of bargain"
standard is only concerned with the actual and represented values
of the property which the plaintiff receives, and these values are
identical when a seller is defrauded by a false undervaluation of
what he gives.
There appears to be no preference between the rival fraud
damage rules in situations where the false representation per-
tains to a collateral matter which ultimately induces a property
transaction, as opposed to situations where defendant's false
statements relate to the value, condition, or characteristics of the
property itself." Suppose, for example, that a certain commercial
lot includes several large storage tanks. The land is relatively
worthless as its stands, but could become quite profitable if a
regular supply of scarce fuel oil for the tanks could be arranged.
Plaintiff is induced to buy the property by the real estate
broker's false representation that he can procure just such a fuel
oil supplier for the purchaser. In this type of situation, courts
have tolerated recoveries measured by both the restitutionary and
"loss of bargain" rules.
An important distinction has been recognized between cases
in which the fraud induces a contract between plaintiff and de-
fendant (where the "loss of bargain" is allowed) and cases in
which the plaintiff bargains with a third person in reliance on
defendant's fraudulent statements (where the "out of pocket" rule
53. Id. at 633, 59 at 124.
54. DOBBS, supra note 7, at 598.
55. McDonald v. Roeth, 179 Cal. 194, 176 P. 38 (1918); MCCORMICK, supra
note 7, at 456; Comment, Expanded Remedies for Real Estate Broker's Misrepre-
sentations, 12 STAN. L. REV. 270, 271-72 (1959), discussing Ward v. Taggart,
51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959); 13 S, CAL. L. REv. 168, 169 (1939).
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applies). In MacDonald v. Roeth6 the defendants were officers
of a bank who deceitfully misrepresented the condition of the
bank to induce the plaintiff to purchase stock of the institution.
Mr. MacDonald, in reliance on the fraud, bought some shares
from the bank itself and others from a third party, Perine. The
California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling which
distinguished between the "benefit of bargain" damages formula
to be applied to the shares bought directly from the defendants
and the "out of pocket" measure of loss for those shares pur-
chased from Perine 7
Application of the "out of pocket" rule when fraud induces
a contract with a third person may reflect a policy judgment that
the chain of causation between deceit and damage is too weak to
warrant imposition of contractual expectancy damages. Or, the
rule might be based on the theoretical objection that the "loss
of bargain" cannot be awarded to plaintiff, since the "bargain"
he entered into was with a third party, and not with the defend-
ant.58
FRAUD DAMAGES IN CALIFORNIA
California's experience with the rules for fraud damages in
property transactions has been uneven and unfortunate. The en-
suing discussion explores the interaction between the judiciary
and the legislature in the search for the appropriate standard for
"property fraud" damages. In broad outline, the "benefit of bar-
gain" rule prevailed prior to a statutory enactment in 1935, which
abruptly reversed existing law and established the "out of pocket"
damage measure. Judicial dissatisfaction with this legislation led
to the creation of a patchwork of exceptions and distinctions be-
tween 1935 and 1971. An amendment in 1971 to the statutory
damage rule for fraud in the purchase, sale and exchange of prop-
erty admits recovery of plaintiffs' lost profits for the first time but
might be construed to forbid use of the "loss of bargain" rule
under any circumstance.
Common Law Background
Prior to 1935, California courts had no statutory mandate on
the measure of damages for fraud. It would be an overstatement
to say that during this period the judiciary worked out a flexible
system, alternating freely between the "benefit of the bargain"
rule and the "out of pocket" measure according to available proof
56. 179 Cal. 194, 176 P. 38 (1918).
57. Id. at 200-02, 176 P. at 38.
58. Id.; DOBBS, supra note 7, at 594.
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and equitable considerations. 9 Rather, the "benefit of bar-
gain" measure was generally, although not exclusively, em-
ployed. 60 In most cases the judiciary adverted to the standard
formulation of "benefit of bargain" rule specifically, the differ-
ence between the actual value of the property received and its value
had the property been as represented."8
The pre-1935 judiciary did apply the "out of pocket" meas-
ure on occasion, when the "loss of bargain" rule was difficult
to apply or when it would work a hardship on plaintiff or defend-
ant.
62
In MacDonald v. Roeth,6 discussed above, the California
Supreme Court used the more limited "out of pocket" rule to
measure recoverable loss when plaintiffs purchased overvalued
stock from a third person, Perine. The court concluded that the
restitutionary rule would achieve substantial justice because the
defendants had no knowledge nor any connection with plaintiff's
transaction with Perine, and because the false representations were
not made with the distinct intention of inducing the purchase
of the Perine stock."
The 1935 Statute
In 1935, the California legislature enacted Civil Code sec-
tion 3343.6 The statute provided that a person defrauded in the
59. Comment, Recovery in Deceit Actions in California, 11 HAST. L.J. 183,
194 (1959) may have read too much into the oft-quoted dicta of Hines v. Brode,
168 Cal. 507, 511, 143 P. 729, 730 (1914) that the "benefit of the bargain"
rule was applied in "clear cases and on just terms."
60. Divani v. Donovan, 214 Cal. 447, 454, 6 P.2d 247, 249 (1931); Hines
v. Brode, 168 Cal. 507, 511, 143 P. 729, 730 (1914); Spreckels v. Gorrill, 152
Cal. 383, 92 P. 1011 (1907); Holcomb v. Long Beach Inv. Co., 129 Cal. App.
285, 19 P.2d 31 (1933); Rogaff v. Bartles, 115 Cal. App. 429, 433, 1 P.2d 517,
518-19 (1931).
61. See note 10 supra; McKeever v. Locke-Paddon Co., 58 Cal. App. 51, 55,
207 P. 1040, 1042 (1922); Jacobs v. Levin, 58 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 913, 915,
137 P.2d 500, 501 (1943). However, awards of the "cost of conformation" were
not unknown. See Crystal Pier Amusement Co. v. Cannan, 219 Cal. 184, 192,
25 P.2d 839, 842-43 (1933).
62. It was stated in Jacobs v. Levin, 58 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 913, 916, 137
P.2d 500, 501 (1943), that "[n]either rule ["out of pocket" nor "loss of bar-
gain"] has proved altogether satisfactory and as a result the law has fluctuated
from time to time ....
63. 179 Cal. 194, 176 P. 38 (1918).
64. Id. at 201, 176 P. at 41.
65. Added by Cal. Stat. (1935), ch. 536, § 1, at 1612. Section 3343 then
read as follows:
One defrauded in the purchase, sale or exchange of property is en-
titled to recover the difference between the actual value of that with
which the defrauded person parted and the actual value of that which
he received, together with any additional damage arising from the par-
ticular transaction.
Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to deny to any person
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purchase, sale or exchange of properties was "entitled" to recover
the difference between the actual value of that which he parted
with and that which he received. The 1935 law also provided for
recovery of "additional damage arising from the particular trans-
action." Although the statute was couched in permissive terms
("is entitled to recover"), section 3343 was almost immediately
interpreted as substituting the minority "out of pocket" rule for
the prevailing "loss of bargain" standard. 6
In 1948 the California Supreme Court ruled in the leading
case of Bagdasarian v. Gragnon6 7 that section 3343 established
"out of pocket" damages as the exclusive, rather than an alterna-
tive, rule for fradulent sales in California. Appellant Bagdasarian
sold his farm to respondant Gragnon, taking a cash down pay-
ment and two notes, one secured by a trust deed on the real prop-
erty and one by a crop and chattel mortgage. The sale to Grag-
non was induced by material misrepresentations concerning var-
ious crop yields of the farm, including plums, nectarines, olives,
figs, oranges and grapes. The purchasers defaulted and Bagdas-
arian brought suit to foreclose the crop and chattel mortgages.
Gragnon successfully cross-complained for damages on grounds
that he had been fraudulently induced to purchase the land.
The appeal by the seller was based inter alia on grounds that
the trial court had improperly applied the "loss of bargain" rule
in establishing the buyer's recoverable loss because section 3343
established an exclusive, not permissive, measure of damages to
one defrauded in the sale of property. 68 The California Supreme
Court agreed.
The Bagdasarian court characterized the state of the law prior
to enactment of section 3343 as uncertain and confusing, and,
considering the "broad" language of the statute, concluded that
the intent of the legislature was to provide a uniform rule for all
such fraud cases.69  The court reasoned that if the statutory
rule was merely alternative then confusion as to the proper rule
for a given case would be multiplied; it would also be unclear
whether choice between alternative damage rules would be a
matter of law for the judge to determine or a question of fact for
the jury to decide.
Justice Schauer dissented in Bagdasarian. In a strong and
having a cause of action for fraud or deceit any legal or equitable rem-
edies to which such person may be entitled.
66. Feckenscher v. Gamble, 12 Cal. 2d 482, 499-500, 85 P.2d 941, 945
(1939); Koyer v. McComber, 12 Cal. 2d 175, 183, 82 P. 941, 945 (1938); Roth-
stein v. Janss Investment Corp., 45 Cal. App. 2d 64, 113 P.2d 465 (1941).
67. 31 Cal. 2d 744, 762, 192 P.2d 935, 945-46 (1948).
68. Id. at 759-60, 192 P.2d at 944.
69. Id. at 762, 192 P.2d at 946.
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well-reasoned opinion he argued that the purpose of the legislature
in enacting section 3343 was not "prohibitively to substitute the
'out of pocket' rule for the 'benefit-of-the-bargain' rule but, rather,
permissively to provide an additional or alternative remedy or
measure of damages which might be applied in proper cases. ' 70
The position of Justice Schauer in Bagdasarian was sound.
The carefully chosen language of the statute indicates that the leg-
islature intended section 3343 to permit an "out of pocket" award
when, in the court's discretion, this was advisable. 7' The su-
preme court's strict reading of the fraud damage statute quite
literally created a refuge for wrong-doers by incorporating into
California law the inherent limitations of the "out of pocket"
rule mentioned earlier.72  For example, the Bagdasarian major-
ity cited with approval an appellate department decision, Jacobs
v. Levin.78  Jacobs also had concluded that section 3343 estab-
lished the "out of pocket" rule as an exclusive measure of dam-
ages. This conclusion required denying relief to the plaintiffs who
purchased a home impliedly represented to contain a usable fire-
place. Although the cost of putting the fireplace into working
order was $470.00, the plaintiffs had no right to damages because
they had paid slightly less than the fair market value for the prop-
erty.
Judicial Subversion of Bagdasarian v. Gragnon
Dissatisfaction with the harsh results of the Bagdasarian rul-
ing soon gave rise to a body of case law which either found the
"out of pocket" rule inapplicable in certain situations or construed
it quite liberally.
In property transaction cases involving the fraud of a fidu-
ciary, the courts created a clear exception in that the broader
damage provisions of California Civil Code sections 1709 (dam-
ages for fraudulent deceit) and 3333 (damages for torts generally)
70. Id. at 765, 192 P.2d at 947 (emphasis original).
71. Prior to 1935 there was occasional uncertainty in California as to
whether "out of pocket" damages could be awarded at all. Wood v. Niemeyer,
185 Cal. 526, 532, 197 P. 795, 798 (1921) (by implication). By enacting CAL.
CIv. CODE § 3343 (West 1970) the legislature probably intended to dispel such
doubt. This view is supported by the permissive language of section 3343 which
states that plaintiff shall be "entitled to" out of pocket loss. Other damage rules
are slipulated in mandatory language. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3334 (West 1970)
("is deemed to be"); CAL. CIv. CODE § 3336 (West 1970) ("is presumed to
be"). See also Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 494, 275 P.2d 15, 24 (1954)
(dissenting opinion of Justice Schauer); Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 2d 744,
764, 192 P.2d 935, 947 (1948) (dissenting opinion of Justice Schauer); Com-
ment, 12 STAN. L. REV. 270, supra note 4, at 273-74.
72. See notes 34-43 and accompanying text supra.
73. 58 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 913, 137 P.2d 500 (1943).
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were held to be the pertinent measures of recovery rather than the
stricter provisions of section 3343.74 This conclusion was
reached by different paths of reasoning. It was said, for example,
that the principal's right to recover was based on the duties in-
herent in the agency or fiduciary relationship, and not on the
transaction per se.75 Walsh v. Hooker & Fay76 was forthright in
its simple assertion that faithless fiduciaries shall make good the
full amount of loss occasioned by their breach of duty, and sanc-
tioned awards of lost profits and earnings in the fiduciary con-
text."7 Walsh noted the particular injustice which results when
the "out of pocket" rule is applied to cases involving stockbroker
fraud. If, for example, the broker fraudulently misrepresented
the stability of a certain stock or the financial security of the
issuing corporation in order to induce a sale, he could escape
damage liability by merely proving the equivalence of the stock's
actual value and the sale price. Such an equivalence would occur
frequently since the value of stock sold on an exchange or traded
over the counter is generally determined by the price at which it is
then bought and sold.78
Indeed, the Bagdasarian ruling unjustly deprived plaintiffs
of damages whenever, despite the fraud, "out of pocket" damages
-measured at the time of the transaction-were minimal or
nonexistent.79  In these cases, the judiciary began to consider im-
portant factors subsequent to the transaction (such as trust deed
foreclosure), and would generally permit restitution of plaintiff
to a pre-transaction status.80
It further became settled that anticipated revenue or profit,
while not itself a proper measure of damages, nor includable under
the rubric "additional damage", could nevertheless be considered
in determining the actual value of property received in a fraudu-
74. Savage v. Mayer, 33 Cal. 2d 548, 203 P.2d 9 (1949) (secret profits by
real estate broker); Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal.
App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968) (investment counselors); Walsh v. Hooker
& Fay, 212 Cal. App. 2d 450, 28 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1963) (salesman for stock broker-
age firm); Simone v. McKee, 142 Cal. App. 2d 307, 298 P.2d 667 (1956) (secret
profits in stock sales transaction).
75. Savage v. Mayer, 33 Cal. 2d 548, 551, 203 P.2d 9, 11 (1949).
76. 212 Cal. App. 2d 450, 461, 28 Cal. Rptr. 16, 24 (1963).
77. Id. See Prince v. Harting, 177 Cal. App. 2d 720, 731, 2 Cal. Rptr.
545, 551 (1963).
78. Walsh v. Hooker & Fay, 212 Cal. App. 2d 450, 462, 28 Cal. Rptr. 16,
24 (1963).
79. See, e.g., Burkhouse v. Phillips, 18 Cal. App. 3d 661, 96 Cal. Rptr. 197
(1971).
80. Id.; Garrett v. Perry, 53 Cal. 2d 178, 186, 346 P.2d 758, 763 (1959);
Feckenscher v. Gamble, 12 Cal. 2d 482, 500, 85 P.2d 885, 893 (1939). See
also Garstang v. Skinner, 165 Cal. 721, 726, 134 P. 329, 331 (1913) (dicta);
Carter v. Turner, 90 Cal. App. 193, 200, 265 P. 870, 873 (1928) (dicta).
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lent sale. In Eatwell v. Beck8 an elderly couple and their chil-
dren invested their entire savings in a ten unit motel property
which they intended to occupy and use as a home and business.
Defendant owners and their brokers fraudulently misrepresented
that the motor court would produce a sufficient income to meet
the monthly trust deed payments and the expenses of the
business. The plaintiffs, who lost the property through foreclo-
sure, sued for fraud but were nonsuited for failure to prove dam-
ages under the "out of pocket" rule of section 3343. The judg-
ment was reversed by the California Supreme Court in an opinion
by Justice Schauer. It was held that anticipated revenue from the
motel was an element to be considered in determining its ac-
tual or market value for purposes of the "out of pocket" rule
and that the trial court had erred in excluding such evidence.82
Obviously, the actual or market value of property is smaller if it
yields less income. Therefore, Eatwell's consideration of antici-
pated revenues in determining the value of the property received,
potentially expanded the damage award under the "out of pocket"
formula.
California courts also liberally construed the "additional dam-
ages" language of section 3343 to overcome the otherwise strict
statutory limitation on fraud damages.8 3  Recovery of conse-
quential damages under the "additional damages" proviso in-
cluded plaintiffs' actual expenditures, damage to other property,
rental of suitable premises and the reasonable value of plaintiffs'
time fruitlessly expended in reliance on a misrepresentation.84
Nevertheless, a defrauded buyer could not recover lost profits
or rentals under the "additional damages" language nor could the
term be construed to permit use of the "loss of bargain" rule. 85
81. 41 Cal. 2d 128, 257 P.2d 643 (1953).
82. Id. at 134, 257 P.2d at 647. See Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 24 Cal. 2d
290, 149 P.2d 177 (1944).
83. See, e.g., Hartong v. Partake, Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 942, 969, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 722, 739-40 (1968); Clar v. Board of Trade, 164 Cal. App. 2d 636, 651-
52, 331 P.2d 99, 106 (1958). "Additional damage" has been construed to in-
clude actual expenditures of time and money, damage to other property, and
rental for other premises. Burkhouse v. Phillips, 18 Cal. App. 3d 661, 665, 96
Cal. Rptr. 197, 199-200 (1971); Williams v. Graham, 83 Cal. App. 2d 649, 189
P.2d 324 (1948); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 901, 903, 906 (1934).
84. 23 CAL. JuR. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 90 (1955). See Hartong v. Partake,
Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 942, 969, 72 Cal. Rptr. 722, 739-40 (1968); Lawson v.
Town & Country Shops, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 2d 196, 205, 323 P.2d 843, 849
(1958); Annot., 167 A.L.R. 271 (1947).
85. See Eatwell v. Beck, 41 Cal. 2d 128, 257 P.2d 643 (1953); Oliver v.
Benton, 92 Cal. App. 2d 853, 208 P.2d 375 (1949). In Oliver the defendants
induced plaintiff to purchase improved real property by fraudulently representing
to her that one of the dwelling units was leased for $125 per month whereas
the actual rental was $77.50. Plaintiff was held not to have been damaged be-
cause the purchase price of the property did not exceed its actual value and be-
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Some cases after Bagdasarian appear to have ignored the
1935 statute altogether, whether by mistake or design!86  In
Nelson v. Marks87 a practicing attorney who also did some farm-
ing bought a used heavy tractor when the defendant told him the
Caterpillar was "tiptop" and that "this tractor will go, you needn't
worry about that. '88  Of course, the tractor did not "go". The
court concluded that the damages awarded by the trial court were
well within the amount that could have been awarded for the
difference between the value of the tractor as its condition was
represented and its actual proven condition (that is, the "loss of
bargain"). The court ironically cited section 3343 to substan-
tiate this proposition.89
Ward v. Taggart9 ° and Coleman v. Ladd Ford Co.91
With characteristic insight and candor, former Chief Justice
Roger Traynor substantially undermined the harshness of the
Bagdasarian rule in Ward v. Taggart.2 In Ward, an unprin-
cipled real estate broker acquired some seventy-two thousand dol-
lars in secret profits by falsely representing to plaintiff's broker
that he, the defendant, had an exclusive listing for certain prop-
erty and that plaintiff's initial offer to purchase this land had been
rejected.98  In fact, defendant was not the vendor's exclusive
agent, and plaintiff's initial bid was acceptable. 4
The court recognized that the defendant had committed
fraud but could not award "out of pocket" damages because of
an absence of relevant proof. Plaintiff did not establish that the
$500 per acre he paid for the land exceeded its market value.
Nor was there a fiduciary relationship, since negotiations were at
arm's length between two real estate brokers. Justice Traynor
resolved the dilemma by invoking principles of constructive
trust, unjust enrichment, and quasi-contract in order to justify an
cause anticipated revenue was not "additional damage" within section 3343. 92
Cal. App. 2d at 56, 208 P.2d at 377.
86. Nelson v. Marks, 126 Cal. App. 2d 261, 269, 271 P.2d 900, 906 (1954).
Cf. Morris v. Harbor Boat Building Co., 112 Cal. App. 2d 882, 889, 247 P.2d
589, 593 (1952) (dicta).
87. 126 Cal. App. 2d 261, 271 P.2d 900 (1954).
88. Id. at 265, 271 P.2d at 903.
89. Id. at 270, 271 P.2d at 906.
90. 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959). The case is discussed in Project,
A Comparison of California Sales Law and Article Two of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 78 (1963); Comment, Expanded Remedies for
Real Estate Broker's Misrepresentations, 12 STAN. L. REV. 270 (1959); 48 CALIF.
L. REv. 342 (1960); 7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 147 (1960).
91. 215 Cal. App. 2d 90, 29 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1963).
92. 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959).
93. id. at 739-40, 336 P.2d at 535-36.
94. Id. at 740, 336 P.2d at 536-37.
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award of both "loss of bargain" and exemplary damages. 5  Ward,
in effect, reinterpreted section 3343 as non-exclusive and admis-
sible of exceptions.
The Ward rationale was extended in Coleman v. Ladd Ford
Co." by sustaining an award of "loss of bargain" damages to a
plaintiff who, relying on false assurances, purchased a new car from
defendant. The fraudulent guarantees related not to the new auto-
mobile but to the sale of plaintiff's trade-in car and termination
of the financing obligations thereon. In the court's view, only
an award of "loss of bargain" and exemplary damages would both
compensate plaintiff and adequately discourage defendant's con-
duct.97  While Ward and Coleman eased the severity of section
3343 as interpreted in Bagdasarian by allowing recovery for the
proceeds of fraud on a constructive trust-unjust enrichment
theory,"8 the relief afforded by those cases was still inadequate.
A plaintiff could expect "loss of bargain" damages only if the
trier of fact was convinced that the defendant would otherwise
be unjustly enriched and had violated some implied duty of fair
dealing with the plaintiff. 99 The 1971 amendment to section
3343 creates complex questions regarding the precedential signi-
ficance of the Ward and Coleman cases. 100
Fraud Damages v. General Tort Recovery
After Bagdasarian v. Gragnon,1'0 Civil Code section 3343
generally was applied as the damage rule in fraud cases con-
cerning the transfer of property. Some confusion has existed,
however, even in the Supreme Court of California,0 2 because
lost profits were regularly awarded to aggrieved plaintiffs under
95. This theory of recovery was not pleaded or raised by the parties. Id.
at 742, 336 P.2d at 537. Cf. Coleman v. Ladd Ford Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 90,
93-94, 29 Cal. Rptr. 832, 834 (1963).
96. 215 Cal. App. 2d 90, 29 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1963).
97. Id. at 92, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
98. Justice Burke wrote in Coleman v. Ladd Ford Co., "In Ward v. Taggart
the Supreme Court opened the door for such further court interpretation of the
section [California Civil Code section 3343] as may be necessary to do justice."
215 Cal. App. 2d 90, 93, 29 Cal. Rptr. 832, 834 (1963) (citations omitted).
99. Letter from Harold F. Bradford, Legislative Representative for the State
Bar of California to the Honorable Ronald R. Reagan on Senate Bill 669, Oct.
8, 1971, filed in the office of the SANTA CLARA LAWYER. See also McCauley
v. Dennis, 220 Cal. App. 2d 627, 634, 34 Cal. Rptr. 90, 95 (1963).
100. See notes 138-39 and accompanying text infra.
101. 31 Cal. 2d 744, 762, 192 P.2d 935, 946 (1948).
102. Comment, Imposing Liability on Data Processing Services-Should Cali-
fornia Choose Fraud or Warranty?, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 140, 153 n.83 (1972)
noted that in Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 490, 275 P.2d 15, 22 (1954)
the majority cites Civil Code section 3333 but in fact applies section 3343. See
43 CAL. L. REv. 356 (1955).
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California Civil Code section 3333,103 the general tort recovery
statute. Thus, prior to 1971, a fraud victim could collect lost
profits and earnings under section 3333 if the fraud did not con-
cern the "purchase, sale or exchange of property.' 10 4  Likewise,
one who sued for simple negligence could pray for future lost
earnings as damages while the fraud victim in property transac-
tions was ostensibly barred from such recovery."'
Except for cases of fraud by a fiduciary, it seems clear that
section 3333 does not state the damage rule for fraud in the pur-
chase, sale, or exchange of property. First, the statute excludes
by its own terms application to breach of contractual obligations.'
Moreover, the express provision for fraud damages in property
transactions, contained in section 3343, precludes operation of sec-
tion 3333.107
Fraud Damages v. Recovery in Contract
In cases not falling within the Uniform Commercial Code,
California's statutes, prior to 1971, allowed plaintiffs to recover a
larger measure of damages in an action for simple breach of con-
tract than in an action for fraud arising from the purchase, sale
or exchange of property.10 8
For a breach of contract the aggrieved party is entitled to
an "amount which will compensate . . . (him) for all the detri-
ment proximately caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary
course of things, would be likely to result therefrom."' 9 Like the
103. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1970) provides:
For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the
measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this
Code, is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proxi-
mately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not.
104. Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp., 28 Cal. 2d 525, 534, 170 P.2d 898,
903 (1946) (fraud); Seaboard Music Co. v. Germano, 24 Cal. App. 3d 618, 622,
101 Cal. Rptr. 255, 257 (1972); Hartong v. Partake, Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 942,
969-70, 72 Cal. Rptr. 722, 739-40 (1968).
105. Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp., 28 Cal. 2d 525, 534, 170 P.2d 898,
903 (1946).
106. See note 103 supra.
107. According to standard principles of statutory interpretation,
[a] special statute dealing expressly with a particular subject con-
trols and takes precedence over a general statute covering the same sub-ject. Where a general statute includes the same matter as that covered
by a special act, the special act will be considered an exception to and
paramount to the general act.
45 CAL. Jun. 2d Statutes § 120 (1958).
108. For the breach of a contract the injured party is entitled to damages
which will give him the benefit of his bargain and place him in the position
he would have been in had the promisor performed. See Coughlin v. Blair, 41
Cal. 2d 587, 262 P.2d 305 (1953). In a contract suit the plaintiff is also entitled
to loss of profits resulting from the breach. See Mann v. Jackson, 141 Cal. App.
2d 6, 296 P.2d 120 (1956); Ross v. Frank W. Dunne Co., 119 Cal. App. 2d
690, 260 P.2d 104 (1953).
109. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 3300 (West 1973).
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similarly phrased tort recovery statute, the damage rule for breach
of contract has been construed to permit awards to plaintiff of
lost profit or gains, at least to the extent that the lost profits were
foreseeable when the contract was made. 10
In short, California's statutory structure before 1971 toler-
ated the injustice that plaintiffs in negligence and simple breach
of contract cases could sue for their lost earnings and lost profits
while the "out of pocket" rule barred the fraud victim in property
transaction cases from recovering more than the difference be-
tween the amount he paid for the property and its actual value.
Moreover, defrauded persons whose situations involved the pur-
chase or sale of property were denied, by statutory law, the
right to lost earnings and profits while those damages were re-
coverable by other fraud victims.
The adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in Califor-
nia further complicated the tangle of rules for fraud damages.
California Commercial Code section 2721111 allows defrauded per-
sons to secure the benefit of their bargain. 112  The provision was
intended to equalize the remedy of buyer or seller in fraud and
breach of warranty cases."13  California's "out of pocket" statute
was not repealed despite its sharp conflict with the Commercial
Code."14
THE 1971 AMENDMENT
In 1971 the California legislature amended Civil Code sec-
tion 3343, the statutory damage rule for fraud in the purchase,
sale and exchange of property. In essence, the amendment al-
lows persons fraudulently induced to purchase property to recover
damages for lost profits. Sevefal important questions raised by
110. Coughlin v. Blair, 41 Cal. 2d 587, 603, 262 P.2d 305, 314 (1953); Tom-
linson v. Wander Seed & Bulb Co., 177 Cal. App. 462, 472, 2 Cal. Rptr. 310,
315-16 (1960).
111. Uniform Commercial Code section 2-721 was adopted without change
in California in 1963 as CAL. COMM. CODE § 2721 (West 1964). It provides
in part that "[r]emedies for material misrepresentation or fraud include all the
remedies available under this division for nonfraudulent breach."
112. See Project, A Comparison of California Sales Law and Article Two of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 78, 138-39 (1963) which
suggests that enactment of section 2721 of the Commercial Code would reinstate
the "loss of bargain" rule in California without reliance on either the Ward or
Coleman cases. Cf. Official Comment to CAL. COMM. CODE § 2721 (West 1964)
and corresponding California Code Comment.
113. Project, A Comparison of California Sales Law and Article Two of the
Uniform Commerci'al Code, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 78, 138-39 (1963).
114. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2721 (West 1964) also conflicted with the election
of remedies rule in CAL. CIv. CODE § 1789 (West 1973). See note 21 supra.
However, unlike section 3343, section 1789 was repealed when the Commercial
Code was enacted.
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the statutory modification will be considered. First, it is unclear
whether the new "lost profits" provision is available to a de-
frauded purchaser if the deceitful representation pertains to some
collateral matter and not to the value, quality or condition of the
property sold. Second, the specification of particular items of con-
sequential damages in the amended statute might influence the
traditional interpretation of the "additional damages" term. Third,
and most important, the impact of the 1971 amendment on the
Ward and Coleman decisions is a critical issue to be resolved.
Loss of Profits and "Other Gains"
The 1971 amendment to section 3343 took the form of
an addition to the "out of pocket" rule. While the statute has
always permitted recovery of "additional damages", the present
law enumerates specific types of consequential damages which
are included within the term. Now expressly recoverable, al-
though sometimes subject to qualifications, are: 1) amounts ex-
pended in reliance on the fraud;115 2) amounts compensating for
loss of use and enjoyment of property due to the fraud;116 and,
3) lost profits or other gains which would have been earned were
the property as falsely represented. 11 7
It should be emphasized that amended section 3343, by its
terms, prohibits recovery of damages for fraud measured by the
115. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3343(a)(1) (West Supp. 1973) provides that one de-
frauded in the purchase, sale or exchange of property is entitled to "out of
pocket" damages "together with any additional damage arising from the particu-
lar transaction, including . . [almounts actually and reasonably expended in
reliance on the fraud."
116. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3343(a)(2) (West Supp. 1973) provides for:
lain amount which would compensate the defrauded party for loss
of use and enjoyment of the property to the extent that any such loss
was proximately caused by the fraud.
117. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343(a)(3)-(4) (West Supp. 1973) provides for the
following "additional damages":
(3) Where the defrauded party has been induced by reason of the fraud
to sell or otherwise part with the property in question, an amount
which will compensate him for profits or other gains which might rea-
sonably have been earned by use of the property had he retained it.
(4) Where the defrauded party has been induced by reason of the fraud
to purchase or otherwise acquire the property in question, an amount
which will compensate him for any loss of profits or other gains which
were reasonably anticipated and would have been earned by him from
the use or sale of the property had it possessed the characteristics
fraudulently attributed to it by the party committing the fraud, provided
that lost profits from the use or sale of the property shall be recover-
able only if and only to the extent that all of the following apply:
(i) The defrauded party acquired the property for the purpose of using
or reselling it for a profit.
(ii) The defrauded party reasonably relied on the fraud in entering into
the transaction and in anticipating profits from the subsequent use or
sale of the property.
(iii) Any loss of profits for which damages are sought under this para-
graph have been proximately caused by the fraud and the defrauded
party's reliance on it.
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traditional "loss of bargain" formula.' 18 Allowing lost profits
as consequential damages while not approving the "loss of bar-
gain" rule is difficult to understand. Both future lost profits and
the "loss of bargain" represent an expectancy interest which may
be difficult to estimate in calculating damages. Indeed, there
may be no satisfactory basis on which to measure the profits
which a new business would generate." 9  In contrast, the value
of property "as represented" can frequently be estimated with
reasonable certainty by the cost of making it conform to the rep-
resented condition or by looking to the value of property with
comparable characteristics. If land is sold to an entrepreneur on
the false representation that it is zoned for commercial develop-
ment, the lost profits of the unestablished business due to the
fraud would be speculative, while the value of equivalent but
properly zoned real estate for the application of the "loss of bar-
gain" rule could reasonably be determined by standard appraisal
techniques.
Lost profit damages for fraud in the purchase or exchange
of property may only be recovered if three statutory conditions
are met. 120  The first, and perhaps most restrictive limitation, is
that the defrauded party must have acquired the property to use
or resell for a profit.' 2 ' Commentators who view the 1971 amend-
ment to section 3343 as a boon to consumers have apparently
overlooked this language which primarily benefits commercial en-
tities and individuals who purchase property for their trade or
business.' 22
Nevertheless, in this writer's view, section 3343 may permit
lost profit damages to purchasers of residential homes. Cer-
tainly investment value is one factor motivating the purchase of a
home, particularly in urban areas where the population is mobile
and land values are soaring. Moreover, profit motive may well
be the dominant factor in the acquisition of a second home, es-
pecially when the unit is sold in a "resort setting" based on an
investment pitch. This first qualification on lost profit damages
does not require that acquisition for profit or resale be the sole or
dominant motive of the purchaser. In accordance with the amel-
118. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343(b)(1) (West Supp. 1973) provides:
Nothing in this section shall . . . [p]ermit the defrauded person to
recover any amount measured by the difference between the value of
the property as represented and the actual value thereof.
119. As to the treatment of lost profits damage in actions for breach of
contract, see Grupe v. Glick, 26 Cal. 680, 160 P.2d 832 (1945); Kuffel v. Seaside
Oil Co., 11 Cal. App. 3d 354, 90 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1970).
120. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3343(a)(4)(i)-(iii) (West Supp. 1973).
121. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343(a)(4)(i) (West Supp. 1973).
122. 47 CALIF. ST. B.J. 126 (1972) described the 1971 amendment as pro-
consumer.
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iorative purposes of the statute, it should be sufficient to satisfy
the profit motive requirement that use or resale for profit is merely
one element which contributes to the buyer's decision to pur-
chase.12
A second limitation on recovery of lost profits is that the
plaintiff must reasonably have relied on the fraud in entering into
the transaction and in anticipating profits from the use or resale
of the property.124
The third restriction imposed is that the lost profits for which
damages are sought must be proximately caused by the fraud and
the defrauded party's reliance on the representation. 125  Incorpo-
ration of "proximate cause" into the damage statute merely re-
states the familiar tort principle that only those damages are re-
coverable which are the proximate result of the breach of an obli-
gation. 126  "Proximate cause", however, denotes numerous vague
rules and policies which are wholly unrelated to causation, so that
this single phrase will considerably complicate fraud cases wherein
lost profits are sought as damages.1 7
Section 3343 permits the defrauded purchaser to recover
lost profits or other gains which "would have been earned by
him from the use or sale of the property had it possessed the char-
acteristics fraudulently attributed to it . .. "128 Implicit in
the statutory language is a requirement that the defrauded plain-
tiff must rely on a representation pertaining to characteristics of
the property sold if he is to recover lost profits. It remains un-
clear whether lost profits would be recoverable when the mis-
representation concerned a collateral matter other than "character-
istics of the property sold."
To illustrate, assume that an investor is considering the pur-
chase of a plot of land which includes a commercial building.
The prospective buyer is willing to purchase the property if the
building could be economically converted into suitable offices.
123. Statutes must be given a reasonable and common sense construction, con-
sonant with the underlying legislative purpose and intention. See Ivens v. Simon,
212 Cal. App. 2d 177, 27 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1963); Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713,
123 P.2d 505 (1943). That construction of a statute is favored which will
lead to a wise policy rather than mischief and absurdity. See Kennard v. Ros-
enberg, 127 Cal. App. 2d 340, 273 P.2d 839 (1954).
124. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3343(a)(4)(ii) (West Supp. 1973).
125. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3343(a) (4) (iii) (West Supp. 1973).
126. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333 (West 1970).
127. Dean Prosser described "proximate cause" as "a tangle and a jungle, a
palace of mirrors and a maze." Prosser, Proximate Cause in Californa, 38 CALIF.
L. REV. 369 (1950). Cf. C. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 187-92 (1953); PROS-
sEa, supra note 7, at 236-90; 43 CALIF. L. REV. 356 (1955). See Gagne v.
Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 491-92, 275 P.2d 15, 22-23 (1954).
128. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343(a) (4) (West Supp. 1973).
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To induce the sale the real estate broker falsely represents that
he can procure a building contractor who will complete the modi-
fications at a favorable rate. Under these circumstances the
cheated buyer may have no right to anticipated rentals from the
offices because the false representation did not pertain to the val-
ue, quality, condition, income or other characteristic of the prop-
erty sold. Rather, the unscrupulous broker misrepresented his
ability to find a contractor who could complete the offices at a
particularly good cost.
It seems doubtful that the legislature in enacting section
3343 deliberately intended to exclude recovery of lost profits when
the fraud concerned a matter other than a characteristic of the
property sold. In such a case the loss due to deception is equally
genuine and provable. In this regard the limitations of rea-
sonable reliance1 29 and proximate cause'30 would adequately pro-
tect a seller from spurious claims to lost profits due to fraud.
Despite the ambiguities and manifold restrictions on awards
of "lost profits", section 3343, as amended, will eliminate the need
for strained judicial fictions such as the "subsequent factor" of
foreclosure in Burkhouse v. Phillips. The plaintiff in Burkhouse
purchased the multi-acre "Gentleman's Farm" anticipating a net
profit from the sale of the walnut crop. Although there were no
"out of pocket" damages resulting from the sale, Mr. Burkhouse
would be entitled, under the 1971 statute, to the profits which
he expected from the land he purchased. The "Gentleman's
Farm" was acquired for profitable use as well as for a residence,
and the sale to Mr. Burkhouse was induced by fraudulent repre-
sentations regarding a characteristic of the property-its crop
yield.' 31
Fraud Inducing Sale
While it generally happens that it is the seller of property
who misleads the buyer, sometimes the buyer defrauds the seller.
If the buyer deceives the seller into believing that his property
is worth much less than its true market value, the general Ameri-
can rule permits the seller to recover the difference between the
price paid and its actual value.'82 California, in accordance
with the majority position, has applied the "out of pocket" rule of
section 3343 in the "buyer cheats seller" situation.'83  Zinn v.
129. See note 124 and accompanying text supra.
130. See note 125 and accompanying text supra.
131. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
132. DOBBS, supra note 7, at 598.
133. Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 24 Cal. 2d 290, 149 P.2d 177 (1944); Wehner
v. Wehner, 68 Cal. App. 789, 230 P. 458 (1924).
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Ex-Cell-O Corporation,1 34 for example, used the restitutionary rule
to measure the damages suffered when an incorporated manu-
facturer's representative was fraudulently induced to sell its capi-
tal no par stock to the manufacturer at a low price. 138
As amended, section 3343 specifically provides that a person
fraudulently induced to sell property is entitled to sue for profits
or gains which might reasonably have been earned had the prop-
erty been retained.3 6 Hitherto lost profits have not been per-
mitted as consequential damages in fraud actions concerning
transactions in property.
Interpretation of the provision for "lost profits" or "other
gains" will involve interesting questions of statutory interpreta-
tion. If an owner has been induced through fraud to sell valu-
able yet non-income producing property such as jewelry, anti-
ques or art, has he suffered lost profits? Certainly such a seller
loses the appreciated value of his asset which would be reflected
in his net worth were the property retained. Nevertheless, his
gain by retention of the property does not constitute rents, is-
sues or profits. 137  The language of section 3343 is broad enough
to embrace as consequential damages the detriment sustained by
a fraudulent inducement to sell appreciated but non-income pro-
ducing property.
A further difficulty arises if and when the unscrupulous
vendee misrepresents the value of what he proposes to give as
consideration for the plaintiff's property. Under these circum-
stances the "out of pocket" rule will yield no compensable dam-
ages so long as the market value of the vendee's property equals
or exceeds that of the vendor. The "benefit of bargain" rule is
most appropriate, then, when the vendee overvalues his prop-
erty.' In its absence, the California plaintiff must rely on
Ward, and predicate his claim for the recovery of lost profits on a
constructive trust-unjust enrichment theory."' He might also
sue for exemplary damages.' 40
134. 24 Cal. 2d 290, 149 P.2d 177 (1944).
135. Id. at 297, 149 P.2d at 181.
136. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343(a)(2) (West Supp. 1973).
137. See Eatwell v. Beck, 41 Cal. 2d 128, 257 P.2d 643 (1953); Oliver v.
Benton, 92 Cal. App. 2d 853, 208 P.2d 375 (1949).
138. DOBBS, supra note 7, at 598.
139. See notes 90-95 and accompanying text supra.
140. In an action for breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where
the defendant has been guilty of fraud, the plaintiff may recover exemplary dam-
ages in addition to actual damages. CAL. COv. CODE § 3294 (West 1970). It
was held in Bagdasarian v. Gragnon that section 3343 was not intended to, and
does not, preclude recovery of exemplary damages. 31 Cal. 2d 744, 763, 192
P.2d 935, 946 (1948).
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Reliance Damages and Loss of Use
In addition to lost profits, section 3343, as amended, spe-
cifies two particular items of consequential damage recoverable
by one defrauded in the purchase, sale or exchange of property.
One item of enumerated "additional damage" covers amounts
actually and reasonably expended in reliance upon the fraud.1"1
The damage rule also provides for an amount which would com-
pensate the defrauded party for loss of use and enjoyment of the
property to the extent that such loss was proximately caused by the
fraud. 142
California courts will have to exercise care to prevent a
duplication of damage awards when plaintiff claims under both
the "lost profits" provision and either the "reliance" or "loss of
use and enjoyment" sections. This is true because the rule
for lost profits recovery (amounts which the property would have
earned were it as represented) itself includes damages and costs
incurred in performing plaintiff's side of the contract.148
For example, suppose that a buyer purchases property im-
proved with rental housing, the sale being induced by a fraudu-
lent representation as to its occupancy rate and rental income.
Even if the buyer suffered no out of pocket damages he would
be entitled under section 3343 to the loss of profits occasioned
by the fraud. He should not be allowed to recover additionally
the purchase price paid for the apartments, although spent in
reliance on the fraud. The purchase price of the property was
a cost that went into plaintiff's initial calculation of profit and
he is fully compensated when lost profits are given to him.
Traditionally, "additional damage" has included such items as
costs of moving to suitable property, rent for other property, the
cost of improvements to land which are lost and the costs of per-
fecting title.14 4  There appears to be little danger of duplicating
damages in awarding lost profits in addition to such items of
consequential damages. Nevertheless, caution must be exer-
cised to insure that one item of special damages is not directly
or indirectly measured by another.
Finally, the specifications of lost profits and loss of use and
enjoyment as items of additional damage in amended section 3343
should not be construed to restrict the range of consequential
damages awardable under the statute. The relevant language is
141. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343(a)(1) (West Supp. 1973).
142. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343(a) (2) (West Supp. 1973).
143. See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 601; MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 601.
144. See 23 CAL. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 90 (1955); 37 AM. JUR. 21
Fraud and Deceit § 362 (1968).
1974]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
expansive, not limiting, 145 and tort policy favors a broad range of
damages for intentional wrongs such as fraud. 146
CONCLUSION
Ever since the Bagdasarian decision misconstrued the 1935
version of Civil Code section 3343 to establish the "out of pocket"
rule as the exclusive measure of fraud damages in property transac-
tions, California courts have found ways to circumvent that rule
in the interests of justice. Unfortunately, the patchwork judicial
relief arising from the Bagdasarian decision has operated un-
evenly.
In 1971, the legislature amended section 3343 but rejected
both the majority "loss of bargain" rule and the emerging "flexi-
bility theory" for establishing damages for fraud in the purchase,
sale, or exchange of property. Instead, the "out of pocket" rule
was retained as the basic California measure of damages and
further recovery of "lost profits or other gains" was permitted un-
der restrictive circumstances.
The amended statute alleviates some of the oppression which
the "out of pocket" rule creates, and generally equalizes the re-
coverable damages in a fraud action concerning a property
transaction with damages in actions for breach of contract, negli-
gence, and simple fraud. The triple limitation on lost profit
awards, however, could create a hardship in situations involving
the purchase of goods where both a personal and a business in-
terest motivate the buyer. This threefold restriction also leaves
unclear whether plaintiff can be awarded "lost profits or other
gains" when the fraudulent misrepresentation does not pertain to
a characteristic of the property sold but rather to a collateral mat-
ter.
Retention of the "out of pocket" rule in California will
no doubt continue to work a hardship on defrauded buyers and
sellers, despite the addition, in 1971, of lost profits as reward-
able consequential damages. It is not difficult to conceive of a
case in which non-income producing property is sold for its mar-
ket price, although fraud induced the sale. For example, it must
be supposed that developers of residential properties sometimes
fraudulently overstate the value of the home but agree to sell "at
a bargain", that is, at its actual value. Faced with these facts,
145. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343(a) (West Supp. 1973) allows the defrauded
plaintiff to recover "additional damage arising from the particular transaction,
including any of the following" (emphasis added). Id. See 45 CAL. JuR. 2D
Statutes § 151 (1958) for the proposition that the word "including" is ordinarily
a word of enlargement.
146. See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 602; PROSSER, supra note 7, at 30-31.
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a court would still find no measurable damages under section
3343 and should return to the constructive trust-unjust enrich-
ment principles of Ward and Coleman to allow plaintiff to re-
cover the benefit of his bargain.
A broad reading of section 3343 would move California
closer to the desirable "flexibility theory" which applies the "out
of pocket" or "loss of bargain" rule according to the available
proof, the culpability of the defendant and the proximity be-
tween the false representation and the loss. Neither rule alone
can operate equitably in all fraud cases involving property transac-
tions. It is imperative that an enlightened judiciary and vigro-
ous bar vindicate cheated plaintiffs and discourage flaudulent
practices by construing liberally the terms of section 3343.
Jeffrey Alan Barnett
